While the military justice systems of numerous militaries share this rationale, recent history questions this premise. Other than the US, which has resisted the wave of reform exhibited in allied military justice systems as of the 1990s, the modern view of discipline in Australia and the UK has resulted in the military justice system trending closer towards a civilianized model, with Canada retaining the military character of the system. 11 In particular, the role of the its second wave of civilianization, in which it will undoubtedly look to its allies for comparative models.
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The paper is divided into three parts. Part A will briefly outline the impact of civilianization on the military justice systems in the UK, Canada, Australia and the US, respectively. Part B will examine how civilianization has affected the involvement of the chain of command in the court martial process. Finally, Part C will offer recommendations for legislators, legal officers and policy experts when considering comparative models as the basis for possible reforms. Perhaps expectedly, the very term`courts martial' derives its name from the evolution of English military jurisprudence. 18 Prior to 1521, military discipline was the responsibility of the Court of the High Constable and Earl Marshal. 19 Eventually, this jurisdiction became the`Court of the Marshal' (when the holder of the Office of the Lord High Constable was beheaded in 1521). 20 In 1666, the Judge Advocate General was given the task to supervise`courts-martial' for the British Army, with the Judge Advocate of the Fleet performing the same task for the Navy (from 1661). 21 The enactment of the Mutiny Act in 1689 proved to be`the beginning of an era' 22 in that it codified military offences in statutes (mutiny and desertion) and provided a rudimentary court martial procedure to try offenders. 23 From 1689 to 1881, successive Articles of War were promulgated by the Crown to work in conjunction with the Mutiny Act to ensure the discipline of soldiers in times of conflict. 24 The 1881 Army Act and the 1866 Naval Discipline Act were the statutory bases for military justice until each of the services promulgated their respective Discipline Acts in 1955 (Army and Air Force) and 1957 (Navy) respectively:
25`m uch of each of them is devoted to the disciplinary code of the service to which it relates and the setting up and procedure of the tribunals to try offences against it ' . 26 While the military justice system`[enjoyed] a longstanding detachment from civilian legal developments and norms,' 27 various decisions from the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) 28 from the 1990s onwards paved the way for substantial modifications to the British military justice system. 29
Findlay and the era of civilianization
Arguably, the civilianization era in the UK began in 1997 with the decision of the ECtHR in Findlay v United Kingdom. 30 The Court examined if the court martial, as it was composed in 1991, satisfied the right to be tried before an independent and impartial tribunal in accordance with Article 6(1) of the European Convention of Human Rights (ECHR). 31 Given that a senior ranking officer convened the court martial and selected the prosecutor, the Court determined that the tribunal was not`free of personal prejudice or bias' 32 and not objectively impartial. 33 The outcome of the Findlay decision was the enactment of the 1996 Armed Forces Act (AFA) that served to`make sweeping changes to the British courts-martial system' . 34 24 Ibid. 25 Ibid, 25 
The 1996 AFA and further challenges
The 1996 AFA resulted in four major changes to the British military justice system. 35 First, the ability of the chain of command to approve or revise sentences was repealed.
36 Second, the judge advocate was given a more prominent role as a member of the court martial' 37 and their rulings on law were now binding on the panel. 38 Third, the ability of the convening officer to select the prosecutor was removed in favour of a`Prosecuting Authority'-a senior legal officer who determines the charges and the type of court martial. 39 Finally, the ability of the convening authority to select the members of the panel was substituted with a`court administration officer' . 40 While the 1996 AFA did not amalgamate the three services, the legislation modified the respective Army, Air Force, and Naval Discipline Acts in the aforementioned fashion.
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The changes advanced in 1996 did not serve to lessen the ECtHR's criticisms of the British military justice system. In addition to unfavourable judgments in 1999 and 2002, the Court rendered two rulings in December 2003 that were critical of the tri-service aspect of the military justice system. 42 For instance, in Grieves v the United Kingdom, the Court was critical of the Royal Navy's court martial system (under the Naval Discipline Act of 1957) due to the role of the Chief Naval Judge Advocate (CNJA) in appointing judge advocates for (naval) courts martial. 43 Despite the changes enacted in 1996, further reforms would be required. 35 
The 2006 Armed Forces Act: trending towards a civilian system
The death knell for the traditional British military justice system may have been the 2006 ECtHR decision in Martin v United Kingdom. 44 In this case, the accused was an 18 year-old dependent of a military member stationed in Germany, who was accused of murder. 45 The ECtHR, using the Findlay rationale, determined that the court martial lacked independence and was not sufficiently impartial, thus violating Article 6(1) of the ECHR. 46 With the myriad of ECtHR decisions in its wake, the British Parliament was left with no choice but to reform the military justice system. 47 One year prior to the Martin decision, the government tabled the Armed Forces Bill 2006 that received Royal Assent in November 2006, but the bill did not come into force until October 2009. 48 The resulting Armed Forces Act 2006 (AFA 2006) served, inter alia, to replace`traditional' ad hoc courts martial with a standing court. 49 Thè new' court martial is comprised of a civilian judge advocate and a panel of three, five or seven (military) members depending on the offence charged. 50 It is a`court of record' similar to a civilian criminal court. 51 The panel votes (by majority) on guilt or innocence. 52 The judge advocate does not vote in matters regarding the guilt or innocence of the accused but does have a vote regarding sentence if there is an equality of votes. 53 The court martial has powers of punishment ranging from imprisonment for life to minor punishments. 54 Consistent with earlier reforms, there is a right of appeal to the Court Martial Appeal Court and, ultimately, to the Supreme Court. 55 Finally, the reforms created an independent Director of Service Prosecutions (DSP); where`there is no requirement that the DSP be a member of [Her Majesty's] forces' . The current DSP is a civilian. 
Canada

Inheriting the British system
It is not surprising that Canada, similar to the other British colonies, adopted its military justice system from the UK. 57 Indeed,`[i]t has been suggested that the early history of the Canadian military justice system is, in effect, the history of British military law' . 58 Following the foundation of Canada in 1867, the Militia Act adopted the British Army model for a code of discipline' . 59 Such legislation was logical given the presence of British troops in Canada both prior to and following confederation. 60 From the promulgation of the Militia Act in 1868 until the conclusion of World War II, Canada utilised the British military discipline system in each of its armed forces (Army, Navy, Air Force). 61 It was not until 1950 that Canada formed a uniform code of military justice in the National Defence Act (NDA). 
The National Defence Act and the Charter: Canadianization of the British system
The NDA retained the two-tier system of military justice inherited from the British: summary trials and courts martial. 63 The The Genereux decision by the Supreme Court of Canada was the first Charter challenge to the traditional court martial system. 69 At issue was section 11(d) of the Charter-the right to be tried before an impartial tribunal-in relation to courts martial. 70 The Court determined that, among other things, the ability of the chain of command to appoint the prosecutor (on recommendation from the Judge Advocate General) and members of the court martial panel violated the Charter's guarantee of a court's independence. 71 Importantly, however, the Supreme Court acknowledged the military justice system as a separate system of justice. 
Somalia and Bill C-25: The modern era of Canadian military justice
The Genereux decision was followed by a dark incident in Canadian military history. During a UN-sponsored mission to Somalia in 1993, Canadian soldiers captured, tortured and killed a Somali teenager. 73 The result was a firestorm in Canada that led to the disbandment of the Canadian Airborne Regiment and a public inquiry and other reports that examined, inter alia, the military justice system. 74 This resulted in the drafting of Bill C-25, an Act to Amend the National Defence Act, in 1998. 75 Bill C-25`marked the first substantial amendments to the Code of Service Discipline in a post-Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms environment.' 76 Reforms included the statutory recognition of the role and functions of the Judge Advocate General, while removing its power to review any finding of a court martial to ensure legality; the establishment of an independent Director of Military Prosecutions and Director of Defence Counsel Services; and the abolishment of the death penalty. 77 The position of Court Martial Administrator was created to statutorily eliminate the ability of the chain of command to appoint panel members.
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Following the enactment of Bill C-25, the military justice system was subject to an independent review in 2003 by a former Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of Canada. 79 The The Australian military justice system enjoyed a 10-year period free from High Court scrutiny until the 2004 case of Re Aird, which involved a service member charged with rape while on leave in Thailand. 98 The Court narrowly held that in the circumstances, a court martial had jurisdiction to hear the charge against the accused.
99
In terms of removing the commanding officer from the court martial process, Australia appeared to follow the lead set by Canada. Challenges to the UK and Canadian military justice system led the Chief of the Defence Force (CDF) to request an independent review of the Australian military justice system in the late 1990's. 100 Recommendations from the 1997 Abadee Report resulted in various amendments that served to eliminate the ability of a convening authority to review the outcome of a court martial convened by that authority. 102 The establishment of these two positions in statute removed the prosecution discretion and convening authority of the chain of command. 103 At this point, the amendments to the Australian court martial system retained the military character of the system. 104 Indeed, in contrast to Canada and the UK, both the DMP and RMJ were military officers. 105 Change towards a more civilianized model, however, would be forthcoming in the near future.
The beginning of civilianization
From 2003-2005, the Senate Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade References Committee conducted the most comprehensive inquiry of the military justice system in Australia's history. 106 The Senate Report is arguably the beginning of the`civilianization era' in Australia. In its examination of service tribunals, the Committee examined developments in other Commonwealth countries such as the UK and Canada, noting that`recent overseas developments also indicate that the current Australian disciplinary system is outdated and may not adequately protect Service personnel's rights' .
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Following submissions and testimony from the Australia JAG and other witnesses before the Committee, 108 the Report made sweeping recommendations to the military justice system that included, inter alia, the abolishment of traditional courts martial to be replaced by a permanent military court. 109 As will be discussed below, this attempt to civilianize the military justice system-some 8 years following the Senate's recommendations-has arguably resulted in a cautionary tale for those charged with developing and implementing military justice policy.
The brief rise of the Australia Military Court
The government agreed with the Senate's recommendation to abolish the traditional ad hoc courts martial and create a permanent military court. 110 To that end, the Australian Parliament passed the Defence Legislation Amendment Act (DLAA) 2006 the court specified that it was not a`court' under Chapter III of the Australian Constitution but a`service tribunal' under Article 51 (vi), the defence power.
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The AMC retained the character of a service tribunal. 113 Its judges were military officers. The Registrar of the AMC (formerly the RMJ) referred charges to the court, and the DMP and the Director of Defence Counsel Services (DDCS) were respectively responsible for prosecuting and defending matters before a military judge alone or a military judge and jury. 114 In supporting the military nature of the AMC, the explanatory memorandum outlining the legislation highlighted the requirements of deployability, a knowledge and understanding of military culture and credibility with members of the ADF as key`philosophies and characteristics' of the court. 118 The Court determined that although the DLAA 2006 stated that the AMC was a`service tribunal' , the legislation also deemed it a`court of record' , thus closely resembling a civilian Chapter III court. 119 The Court struck down the DLAA 2006 thus invalidating the AMC and all of its prior judgments. 
The aftermath of Lane: a return to the old system (for now)
The government was obviously left in a precarious position. With no service tribunal in place to address serious disciplinary cases, Parliament was forced to enact legislation to revive the`traditional' court martial system. 121 In 2010, the government announced that a new military court would be established not under the defence power but pursuant to Chapter III of the Constitution. 122 The court-known as the Military Court of Australia (MCA)-would be a permanent court comprised of civilian judges with military experience. 123 The legislation creating the court provided that all charges would be tried by judge alone with no military panel or jury, regardless of the seriousness of the offence.
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The debate over the bill was short lived with the calling of an election in July 2010. 125 In the interim, the government passed further legislation to allow for the`traditional' system of courts martial to act as the service tribunal for serious disciplinary offences in the ADF. 126 Ironically, the traditional system of courts martial was later examined by the High Court whereby it expressed no concerns regarding its constitutionality.
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In 2012, the Australian Parliament later introduced the MCA Bill that was similar to that proposed in 2010. 128 As with the previous bill, the MCA Bill 2012 provides for any service offence to be tried by judge (or judges) alone.
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Not surprisingly, the problems associated with the lack of a jury or panel has 121 brought forth considerable criticism during committee study. 130 Academics, practitioners and interest groups identified a likely constitutional challenge to the MCA based on section 80 of the Constitution. 131 The Committee's final report, while recognising this limitation to the bill, recommended that it proceed through Parliament. 132 Following the election in September 2013, it is unclear whether the MCA Bill 2012 will become law. 133
The United States
It is against the backdrop of civilianization over the past twenty years that this paper now turns to developments in the US. In stark contrast to the three countries examined above, the American military justice system has remained generally unaffected by the recent trend away from a command-based model in the court martial system. As with Canada and Australia, the US adopted British military law. As such, the American Articles of War mirrored those from Great Britain. 136 The various iterations of the American Articles of War`provided for trial by courts-martial, although the jurisdiction and composition of these courts were modified from time to time' . 137
The inter-war years: reflecting on the military justice system
Up until World War I, interest in the military justice system had been waning, but soon thereafter, the Acting Judge Advocate General of the Army expressed criticism of the military justice system because of numerous cases, which had handed out the death sentence to offenders without legal review by his office. 141 Many were appalled with the state of the military justice system and`a hue and cry arose for reform ' . 142 This became the precursor to the second era of the American military justice system. In 1948, the Elston Act was enacted, which included a prohibition of unlawful command influence, automatic appellate review in certain cases and a Miranda-like warning-years before that historic case would be decided. It has been suggested that the UCMJ in 1951 reflected certain aspects of civilianization in that`the new Code was an effort to combine … the old command-dominated military justice system and the civilian criminal justice system with its heavy emphasis on due process.' 150 From a comparative perspective, this case is strikingly similar to the Canadian Genereux case given that amendments to enhance the system were slated to go forward as the respective courts scrutinized the`old' system. The Executive Summary identified the pretrial role of the convening authority to select court martial members as an area of concern and recommended increasing the independence of military judges, implementing additional protections in death penalty cases and repealing the rape and sodomy provisions of the UCMJ. 168 Following release of its recommendations, the reaction of the military justice community appeared mixed. 169 A second Cox Commission was established in 2009 and recommended changes to the military justice system that focused on appellate, trial procedure and investigative processes. 
Recent cracks in the command-centric model
The military justice system has also been examined by the executive and legislative branch in light of high-profile sexual assault cases. 171 Allegations of sexual assault at a US Air Force's basic military training site have resulted in 12 confirmed or alleged victims of sexual assault since June 2011. 172 In a statement to the House Armed Services Committee in January 2013, the Chief of Staff of the US Air Force stated that six accused had been court-martialled with four trials scheduled in the future. 173 Further, in early 2013, a decision by a reviewing authority to dismiss the sexual assault conviction rendered by a court martial was met with a decision by the Secretary of Defence to examine the role of the convening authority (a function of the chain of command) in that particular case and its role in the military justice system generally. 174 military where they examined, among other things, the role of the chain of command in the military justice system and reforms made in Canada and the UK. 175 In early April 2013, the Secretary of Defense put forth the recommendation that Congress remove or amend certain authorities of the commanding officer to review the findings or sentence at court martial. 176 Despite the recent interest in the US military justice system, 177 as compared to its three allies, America remains the sole country to retain the commander as the key actor in court martial procedures (with Australia retaining the current system on an interim basis). 178 The next section of the paper will compare the effect of civilianization in the countries noted above with a focus on the impact these changes have made to the chain of command's involvement in the court martial process.
Civilianization and the chain of command
The United Kingdom: continuing the slide towards civilianization?
Reforms in the UK continue to push its military justice system further towards civilianization, in no small part due to pressure of the ECtHR which eliminated the chain of command from the court martial process in the Findlay case in 1997. 
The 1996 AFA, Findlay and the removal of the commander from the court martial process
The Findlay decision had a chilling effect on the involvement of the chain of command in the military justice system. Prior to Findlay and the amendments in the 1996 AFA, the convening officer approved the charges and type of court martial, convened the court and appointed the president and members. 180 The cumulative effect of the Findlay decision coupled with the legislative changes in 175 See Senate Armed Services Committee hearing, above n 171, 59. 176 See Hagel Statement, above n 13. 177 See generally Senate Armed Service Committee hearing, above n 171, Hagel letter, above n 13, Panetta letter, above n 13. 178 In contrast, the Judge Advocate General (who is a civilian) conceded this point while stating that any amendments to the court martial system should mirror its civilian counterpart, opining that`the court martial system should reflect the Crown Court in all respects except where there are good operational reasons for differences.' 183 In terms of the chain of command's involvement in the disciplinary process, one former Chief of the Defence Staff, Lord Boyce, objected to changing the role of the commanding officer in the British system,`[if] you diminish [the commanding officer's] authority or start to erode his authority you will get a fracture which is ultimately going to cause failure' .
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Despite Lord Boyce's warning, the ECtHR cases and the amendments in 1996 and 2006 resulted in the removal of the commander from the court martial process. 185 In terms of the administration of courts martial, the commanding officer has given way to a civilian administrator who`is responsible for arranging the trial.' 186 The administrator selects the witnesses and any officers`under the command of the higher-authority (i.e. the old convening authority) will not be selected as members of the court martial.' 187 185 See Hansen, above n 7, 441-442 (describing the changes made through the AFA 1996). 186 Ibid, 441. 187 Ibid. following trial were also removed along with the corresponding authority to quash or substitute a sentence. 188 It seems clear that the amendments in 2006 delineated`serious matters'-to be kept free from the chain of command 189 -from`discipline matters' that could be handled within the unit. 190 In fairness to those charged with implementing the amendments, the long shadow cast by the ECtHR following a decade of criticism coupled with Parliamentary review may have led to a bill that inundated the military justice system with civilianized procedures in an effort to demonstrate that the system was ECHR compliant.
Possible impacts of Findlay and AFA 1996, 2006 on the military justice system
It is difficult to measure the degree to which the removal of the commanding officer from the court martial system has affected discipline. advocate. 194 One could surmise that this aspect of the military justice system has become de facto civilian.
A related question regarding civilianization is whether there is an end-state other than that of a civilian criminal justice system. For example, despite the arguments that the civilianization of the system in 2006 was a positive trend, 195 it arguably remains viewed as a flawed system. Supporting this notion is the reaction following the tragic events of 13 September 2003, when British soldiers captured and abused an Iraqi detainee. 196 Three years later, seven soldiers were court-martialled for offences including manslaughter. 197 One accused plead guilty and the remaining six were acquitted or the charges were dismissed by the judge advocate following closing of the prosecution's case. 198 The outcome of the courts martial eventually led to a public inquiry and human rights organisations demanding a complete overhaul of the military justice system. 199 Despite the fact that the judge advocate was a civilian and the chain of command presumably had no involvement in the convening, prosecution or adjudication of the cases, it has been asserted that`[t]he military court-martial is an inherently self-serving institution with a tendency to operate as a damage limitation mechanism' . 200 Thus the trend towards civilianization could continue. Further amendments to the 2011 Armed Forces Act allow the DSP to delegate prosecutions to civilians-not solely to military officers as was previously the case. 201 Whether or not ceding the prosecutorial and judicial function to civilians is in the best interests of fairness to the accused and discipline in the British Armed Forces may be debatable, but it appears clear that the UK military justice system is moving closer to a civilian criminal justice system model.
Canada: initial change then`holding the line'
In describing the impact of civilianization on modern military codes, one author has claimed,`Canada was one of the first countries to lead this revolution.' 203 In contrast to Australia, this`revolution' was not self-imposed. 204 As discussed above, the implementation of the Charter in 1982, coupled with the Supreme Court's decision in Genereux and the aftermath of the Somalia affair, forced the Canadian government to make changes to its military justice system. 208 Following the Somalia affair, he was tasked by the Minister of National Defence to produce a report examining the workings of the military justice system and make recommendations. 209 Between the drama of the Somalia Inquiry hearings and the legislative changes made under Bill C-25, the`Dickson Report' served as a measured independent view of the unique challenges of retaining the traditional powers of the commanding officer in consideration of the legal rights outlined in the Charter.
Dickson bluntly noted that`[t]he commanding officer is at the heart of the entire system of discipline.' 210 This statement may appear trite, yet in the shadow of the Somalia Inquiry it was possible that the military justice system would be radically restructured. 211 Thus, when considering legislative amendments in relation to the commanding officer's role in the court martial process, the context in which these changes were made are important-the very existence of the military justice system was at stake.
Bill C-25: modernizing the court martial system by introducing independent actors
The 1999 changes to the military justice system served to eliminate the traditional role of the commanding officer from the court martial process. 212 As noted earlier, the combined impact of Genereux and Bill C-25 eliminated the chain of command from any involvement in the selection of panel members, assignment of prosecutors and review of sentence. 213 These changes included the creation of an independent (military) Director of Military Prosecutions (DMP) and (civilian) Court Martial Administrator. 214 Once charges were referred to the DMP, the sole involvement of the chain of command in the court martial process was for the commanding officer and the next senior officer to provide a letter to the DMP explaining how the alleged offence impacted discipline. 215 The decision to proceed (or not) with charges and the conduct of the prosecution rests solely with the DMP. 
2.2.3`Holding the line' in the military justice system: resisting civilianization
Over the past decade, no major tensions between civilianizing the military justice system and the requirement for a separate system of justice to enforce discipline have arisen. For instance, there have been no Supreme Court challenges to the military justice system since Genereux in 1992 and the National Defence Act has not been significantly amended since 1998. 217 Further, in the four draft bills introduced in Parliament to address the Lamer Report recommendations, the government appears to have consistently`drawn the line' 212 See Hansen, above n 7, 437. 213 See Goetz, above n 11. 214 Ibid. in resisting further changes relating to the chain of command's involvement in the military justice system and civilianization in general. 218 These bills, including the one currently under study in Parliament, do not make any significant changes to the commanding officer's limited role in the court martial system. 219 In contrast, the bill proposes to reinforce the unique military character of the system by introducing principles of sentencing with the aim`to promote the operational effectiveness of the Canadian Forces by contributing to the maintenance of discipline, efficiency and morale.' 220 It is difficult to measure the impact upon discipline, if any, of removing the commanding officer from the court martial system. When examining the number of courts martial following the changes in 1999, the chain of command appeared to be uncomfortable with the new process. 221 However, the consistent number of courts martial in the following decade suggests that the chain of command has subscribed to the new system and that the 1999 amendments have served to enhance the military justice system as a means to instil discipline. 222 In this regard, a recent survey on the military justice system conducted by the Office of the Judge Advocate General stated,`[t]he [military justice system] as a whole effectively meets the needs of the chain of command.' 
Australia: in the throes of civilianization
Australia appeared to have a well-functioning, constitutionally compliant military justice system before the Senate produced its 2005 report. 224 The myriad of 218 See generally Bills C-7, C-45 and C-41, above n 82; see also Bill C-15, above n 83. 219 Ibid. change in Australia in the intervening years represents a clear warning for allied military justice systems of the potential complexities of civilianization.
The Australia Senate Report: recommendations for reform
The Senate's examination of the military justice system did not truly come`out of the blue'; rather, it was a response to a number of inquires into the military justice system that compelled the legislative branch to consider the issue. 225 It was clear from the outset that the Senate was not receptive to the traditional role of the commander in the military justice system. The Committee gave little credence to the testimony of the Australian CDF when he stated that`the control of the exercise of discipline, through the military justice system, is an essential element of the chain of command.'
226 Although the Committee,`accept[ed] [the] basic premise' and the general validity of this proposition, it concluded that`the weaknesses in the system … all suggest that current structures are adversely affecting the rights of Service personnel.'
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The Committee appeared to defer to the opinion of civilian practitioners that subscribed to the opinion that service tribunals fundamentally lacked fairness, independence and impartiality due to`the very nature of the military adjudicating the military' . 228 In the end, the Committee made 23 recommendations regarding the military justice system, which were prefaced by this statement, in bold typeface:`[a]ll recommendations are based on the premise that the prosecution, defence and adjudication functions should be conducted completely independent of the ADF' . 
Fallout from Lane: moving further away from the chain of command
Given the abbreviated tenure of the AMC following Lane, it is difficult to gauge what effect, if any, the revised court martial process had upon military discipline. However, in a 2008 speech, the former Chief of the Australian Army expressed his views on the dissonance between civilianized reforms to the military justice system and the distrust of the chain of command to administer this system:`I was concerned with the implicit view shown by the recommendations that the 225 Australia Senate Report, above n 10, para 1.4; see also Duxbury, above n 118, at 162. 226 Ibid, para 5.1. 227 Ibid, para 5.2. 228 Ibid, para 5.19. Regardless of these concerns, the Australian military justice system is in the throes of civilianization. The 2012 proposed legislation creating the Military Court of Australia would eliminate the court martial system for trial by civilian judge (or judges) alone regardless of the seriousness of the offence. 231 The legislation (as in 2010) also provides for an`emergency provision' whereby the courts martial could be convened in operational theatres if and when necessary.
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While the legislation has yet to be enacted, the bill stands as a cautionary tale for military justice reform. For instance, it is interesting to speculate what a service member accused of a serious offence would prefer-a court martial convened by the RMJ with the requisite military judge and panel, or trial before a civilian judge with no benefit of a jury. Further, the notion of a court martial on`stand-by' for operational reasons risks a significant number of years passing before military prosecutors and military judges would be called upon to prosecute and adjudge a service member for what could be a serious service offence. system. Indeed, one could take the view that the current system is compliant with both the Australian Constitution and international conventions. 236 In the end, whatever form the Military Court of Australia will take, prudence is recommended for any further iteration of the bill should the 2012 version not become law. The uniqueness of a military justice system as sui generis does not preclude adopting elements of the civilian criminal justice system to enhance the fairness and transparency of courts martial. However, caution is advised when considering the impact of importing civilian criminal justice practices to a military disciplinary system under the assumption that the former is the standard to which the latter must aspire. This premise was best captured in the written submission of the Inspector General of the ADF before the Senate Committee. He emphasised that the military and civilian justice systems are divergent in a key respect in that the former has the primary role to assist the chain of command in maintaining order and discipline in the ADF.
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Amongst the four countries examined in this paper, the US stands alone in retaining the`traditional' command-centric military justice system. While the Uniform Code of Military Justice has withstood major reform for some time, 238 it appears that the US military justice system could be on the precipice of thè second wave' of civilianization.
The United States: entering the second era of civilianization?
While the US has been criticised in academic circles for not`modernizing' their military justice system in step with their allies, 239 this paper argues a counterpoint: the American military justice system has struggled with civilianization some 20 years before their allies and has not faced the external pressures experienced in the UK, Canada and Australia. began following World War II. 241 In terms of the role of the commander in relation to the court martial process, the Elston Act in 1948 and the UCMJ 242 in 1950 ushered in the`modern military justice system in the United States' . 243 Arguably, civilianization was once again on the agenda with the enactment of the Military Justice Act of 1968. 244 The theme of civilianization was further evident with the enactment of the Military Rules of Evidence in 1980:`[t]he adoption of the military rules accomplished the goal of further legitimizing the military justice system by grounding it when possible on established federal practices…' 245 Finally, the promulgation of the Military Justice Act of 1983 further points toward civilianization with the extension of the Supreme Court's ability to hear matters from the Court of Military Appeals. 246 These legislative initiatives did not fundamentally alter the command-centric focus of the chain of command in relation to court martial procedures, unlike what would later befall the UK, Canada and Australia. 247 In comparison with countries noted above, it appears the US is not`lagging behind' in terms of modernization, but was the forerunner in considering the role of the commander in its military justice system.
Despite the relative stability in its military justice system over the past 60 years, recent events suggest that the role of the commanding officer in the US court martial system may be reformed. 248 As noted earlier in this paper, a series of high-profile events related to the military justice system has caused the legislative and executive branch to examine the current structure in detail. 249 From a comparative perspective, during a March 2013 Senate Armed Services Subcommittee hearing studying sexual assault in the military, one senator observed the decision in Great Britain and Canada to remove certain historical responsibilities from the chain of command and questioned if such reform would be problematic in the US military justice system. 250 The Judge Advocates'
General from the Armed services and the Acting General Counsel generally supported the role of the commanding officer in the court martial system or were silent on the issue.
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In the end, recommended changes to the UCMJ came less than one month following testimony of the DoD Acting General Counsel before the same Senate subcommittee, as the Secretary of Defense announced recommendations to Congress to amend the convening authority's ability to review sentences in two significant ways.
252 First, the discretion for a convening authority to set aside a conviction for serious offences would be removed. 253 Further, any changes made by a convening authority to a court martial finding or sentence would require written reasons.
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In contrast with its allies and while there appear to be fissures in the historical traditions of the commanding officer in the American military justice system, those responsible for superintending military justice have been steadfast in their support and confidence in this`traditional model' . 255 While it could be debated whether or not the US has or will enter a`second wave' of civilianization, all four countries examined in this paper continue to incorporate civilian criminal justice procedures into their respective military justice systems. The next section of the paper offers some recommendations in this regard.
Recommendations
Canada and Great Britain: study the impact of civilianization
Given the transformation of the Canadian military justice system over the past decade, it would be beneficial to study the impact of removing the chain of 251 command from the court martial system and the consequences, if any, on discipline and its relationship to operational effectiveness. As part of his statutory role to superintend the administration of the military justice system, the JAG must table a report to Parliament each fiscal year. 256 Traditionally, the report examines a number of issues within the military justice system, including a qualitative survey that examines the views of the chain of command to identify any systemic issues of concern. 257 Following the 1999 amendments, one survey indicated some confusion about the role of the chain of command in referring charges and convening courts martial. 258 However, that survey (in 2000) and subsequent surveys conducted in 2007 and 2010 show that respondents took the view that the military justice system met the needs of the chain of command to instil discipline. 259 While the respective reports indicated that the chain of command is generally satisfied that the military justice system-as a whole-meets the needs of the chain of command, 260 further study is required regarding the court martial system. For instance, all three surveys indicate that court martial proceedings are unduly administrative. 261 It is unclear whether these comments are related to the relative lack of involvement of the chain of command once charges are preferred or some other factor.
In this context, given the relative stability in the number of courts martial in recent history coupled with the conclusion of combat operations in Afghanistan, 262 it is recommended that the JAG conduct a more detailed study to capture the chain of command's views regarding the commanding officer's role in the court martial process. In particular, information pertaining to whether 256 or not the amendments have strengthened or weakened the perceived ability of the commanding officer to maintain discipline could provide valuable insight in determining if the modified role of the chain of command in the court martial process has served to impact operational effectiveness. Finally, additional surveys with the Canadian Military Prosecution Service and legal officers serving in regional offices who advise commanding officers would also capture any recommendations in relation to the potential involvement of the chain of command in the court martial process once charges are laid.
A similar recommendation applies to the British military justice system. The multitude of changes following the Findlay decision in 1997 and the enactment of the AFA 1996 and 2006 have transformed the role of the commanding officer in the court martial process. 263 It is unclear whether such changes are perceived positively by the chain of command or, more importantly, balance the interests of discipline and operational effectiveness with fairness toward the accused. To that end, an internal or independent review to examine the impact of the changes on the British military justice system in light of the 1996 and 2006 amendments is recommended. Given the tenor of civilian-like changes in the military justice system over the past decade, an independent review could focus its recommendations on how to integrate civilian authorities within the military milieu while examining if the modified system should allow for some involvement by the chain of command in the court martial process.
Australia and the United States: consider modifications to the current system
Australia is clearly trending towards the adoption of a civilianized military justice model. While the Lane decision in 2009 required interim legislation to re-establish the traditional court martial system, the proposed Military Court of Australia is arguably not a better system than the more`traditional' system currently in place. Indeed, the current system was not viewed negatively by the High Court in 2010. 264 Given the tumultuous recent history of military justice reform in Australia, perhaps the best advice can be gleaned from the current Australian DMP, who stated that the military discipline system would not survive should the MCA Bill 2012 be struck down on constitutional grounds. 265 In light 263 See Hansen, above n 7, 441; Blackett, above n 188, 4.02, 5.142. 264 See Haskins, above n 127, para 21; Nicholas, above n 127. In contrast, the US is currently reviewing the role of the chain of command in the court martial process both on deployed operations and in the context of sexual assault cases. 266 Pending recommendations and potential legislative amendments on these issues, 267 the role of the commanding officer could change in the coming months. 268 However, based upon the recent Senate subcommittee hearings and statement by Secretary of Defense Hagel, 269 it does not appear that the`traditional' role of the commanding officer will be radically altered. 270 When considering potential changes to the role of the commanding officer in the American military justice system, an in-depth study on comparative practices amongst`Anglo-American' allies is recommended to fully understand the possible impact of altering the traditional role of the chain of command in relation to discipline in the American context.
Establishing an Allied Military Justice Committee
One recurring theme throughout this paper has been that every country examined above has cited the other in some regard. 271 Despite this perceived reliance on comparative military law, it is proposed that legislators and those groups advocating reform must approach this exercise with great caution. For instance, academics may correctly point to the Genereux decision as a watershed moment in Canadian military justice but fail to appreciate the political climate surrounding Bill C-25 and its impact on legislative reform. 272 In other cases, many academics are understandably unfamiliar with comparative military justice systems. 273 Given the scope of changes discussed above, there appears to be a need for those charged with the superintendence of military justice systems in those countries to be aware of significant legislative or judicial decisions amongst the`Anglo-American' 274 countries. In this regard, it is proposed that these four countries form an ad hoc Military Justice Committee to keep appraised of developments in their respective countries. 275 While one academic has proposed a similar idea to include civilian judges and academics, 276 this paper proposes a slightly modified recommendation with the Committee limited to uniformed military justice practitioners charged with advising their respective Judge Advocates' General (or his/her equivalent) on strategic military justice policy. 277 This would allow military justice experts to gain an in-depth view of reform from the policy-makers themselves and therefore benefit from the context in which the reforms are proposed.
Conclusion
It is unquestionable that the US and their`Anglo-American' 278 allies have travelled different paths in attempting to reconcile the need for discipline in an armed force with that of ensuring that an accused is provided with fair and due process. While academics have cited the lack of change in the American military justice system when compared to its allies, 279 further examination reveals that it was the US, not its allies, that underwent a significant period of civilianization some 20 years before the term arguably became in vogue across military justice circles. 280 The pace of reform over the past 20 years calls into question whether or not this wave of civilianization threatens the very existence of the`Anglo-American' 281 military justice systems. While numerous reports in these countries subscribe to the notion of the commander as the`heart of discipline,' 282 it appears that such notion 274 See Dhal, above n 3. 275 See generally Hansen, above n 7, 452; Fidell, above n 239, 210 (noting that US jurisprudence does not follow international developments in military justice). 280 See generally Everett, above n 1; Sherman, above n 2; Karlen, above n 5; Hodson, above n 5. 281 See Dhal, above n 3.
could be at risk should this trend of civilianization continue. Whether or not the US will retain its current system has yet to be determined; but those entrusted with the superintendence of the military justice systems in the aforementioned countries would be wise to pay heed to the effect of civilianization among their closest allies and to question whether such reform is in the best interests of discipline and fairness to the accused.
